deconstitution of Croats

Pro-Bosnian appropriation of the state

Piše desk  /  03.02.2022., 09:13h
The main culprits for the failure of negotiations on the reform of the BiH Election Law are the self-proclaimed "pro-Bosnian forces / parties", both those that participated in the negotiations in Neum (SDA, NiP and SBB) and those that did not (SDP, DF and NS).

Author: Ivan Vukoja / Institute for Social and Political Research (IDPI) Mostar

The explanation of the previous statement is very simple and is in the national structure of their voters. Namely, out of 100% of the votes that "pro-Bosnian parties" receive in the elections, more than 95% of votes come from Bosniaks, i.e. citizens of BiH who in the last valid census independently and freely identified themselves as Bosniaks. The share of Croat and Serb votes, as well as the votes of "others" (national minorities and nationally undeclared) is statistically, and especially politically, so small that it is negligible. Therefore, it would be much more correct to call the "pro-Bosnian bloc" the "pro-Bosniak bloc".

Since the current (unconstitutional) BiH Election Law allows Bosniaks full control of the executive in the Federation of BiH, the election of two members of the three-member BiH Presidency and potentially 50%, or even 2/3 of the BiH Council of Ministers, it is understandable that the parties which are basing their electoral success solely on Bosniak votes will not support changes in the BiH Election Law that would diminish the electoral potential of the Bosniak electoral will.

Once again, if the BiH Election Law is not changed, the Bosniak electoral will has the potential to elect 14 of the 17 members of the Bosniak Club of the House of Peoples of the FBiH Parliament, 12 of the 17 members of the Serb Club, 6 of the 17 members of the Croat Club and 5 of the 7 members of the Club of the Others in the 2022 General Elections. Consequently, the President of the FBiH and the two Vice-Presidents and the entire Government of the FBiH would be an expression of the exclusively Bosniak electoral will. From these positions, representatives of the Bosniak electoral will could ask for 2/3 of the power at the level of the Council of Ministers of BiH, and they would get a minimum of 50%. In addition, the Bosniak electoral has the capacity to elect two of the three members of the BiH Presidency completely independently.

Therefore, if the 2022 elections are held according to the existing Election Law, Bosniaks can have 100% of executive power at the FBiH level (President and two vice presidents and the FBiH Government), 2/3 of power in the BiH Presidency and at least 50% of power in the BiH Council of Ministers. In that case, Croats would have 0% of power at the FBiH level, 0% of power in the Presidency of BiH and 0% of power in the Council of Ministers of BiH, even if all Croats in BiH with voting rights vote in the polls 2022 and if all of them vote for parties of the Croatian National Assembly (HNS) of BiH. In other words, 100% of Croat electoral will would result in 0% of power at both the entity FBiH and state levels.

If the HNS BiH proposal would be adopted, Croats would have 1/3 of the power at the FBiH level, 1/3 in the BiH Presidency and 1/3 in the BiH Council of Ministers. In that case, instead of 100% power at the FBiH level, Bosniaks would have 2/3; in the Presidency instead of 2/3 they would have 1/3 and in the Council of Ministers of BiH instead of 50% they would have 1/3 of power.

This is the main party-political reason why the "pro-Bosnian parties", which base their election results exclusively on the Bosniak electoral will, want the 2022 elections to be held according to the existing Election Law of BiH. Therefore, they never had a serious intention or will to harmonize the Election Law of BiH with the BiH Constitution and to enable Croats to elect legitimate representatives. All the more so because in the meantime they have taken control of the Central Election Commission.

Therefore, no "pro-Bosnian party" has ever come up with any concrete proposal for changes to the Election Law of BiH. Instead, they offered their unconstitutional and maximalist demands (abolition of national affiliations, abolishing the principle of legitimate representation of constituent peoples, reducing the powers of the House of Peoples, etc.) and opposed the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (Sejdic-Finci et al.) to decisions of the Constitutional Court of BiH (Ljubić and Čolak) in order to create the illusion that the existing Election Law of BiH does not suit them either.

It is clear that the "pro-Bosnian side" did not care about the rights of Sejdic-Finci and other non-members of the constituent peoples from the fact that they usurped not only Croat and Serb positions in the House of Peoples of PFBiH, but also positions in the Club of Other in HoP of PFBiH. The commitment of the "pro-Bosnian side" to the implementation of ECtHR judgments is not aimed at ensuring the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, but at reducing and abolishing the constitutional rights of Croats. The "pro-Bosnian forces" want to use the implementation of the Sejdic-Finci verdict as a means of domination over Croats, and not as a mechanism that will enable Sejdic and Finci to run for the BiH Presidency. Another in a series of confirmations of the previous thesis is the fact that at the negotiations in Neum they were shocked by the opinion of the Venice Commission, which says that the HNS BiH proposal satisfies the implementation of the Sejdic-Finci verdict. Despite the positive opinion of the Venice Commission, the "pro-Bosnian parties" rejected the HNS BiH proposal, although they had repeatedly stated that they would accept any opinion of the Venice Commission and insisted on implementing the Sejdic-Finci verdict.

Negotiations have served and continue to serve to “pro-Bosnian forces” to dilute the story, procrastinate and buy time, on the one hand, and on the other hand, to create political, ideological and media preparations for the continuation of the process of deconstitution of Croats and their complete elimination from power at the FBiH level, but also at the state level. Only after that would there come a real attempt to expel the Croats as a constituent people from the FBiH Constitution, and then from the BiH Constitution.

This is evident from the very name "pro-Bosnian bloc", which, as we have already stated, is an expression of exclusively Bosniak electoral will. The "pro-Bosnian bloc" is, in fact, considered by its members to be a pro-state bloc. Thus, all parties and political forces that are not part of that bloc are declared and considered anti-Bosnian, that is, anti-state. And these are all parties from HNS BiH and all parties from RS. Therefore, political actors who are an expression of the Bosniak electoral will consider all political actors who are an expression of the Croat and Serb electoral will to be anti-state elements and forces. It is obvious from this that the "pro-Bosnian forces" believe that BiH is their state in which they will determine an acceptable measure of political Croatness and Serbness, in which they will give and allow something to Croats and Serbs. At the same time, they feel so powerful and sovereign that they believe that they have the right to change the name of their own country.

In all of the above, it should be borne in mind that the implementation of the ideological and political agenda of "pro-Bosnian parties and forces" means not only a brutal violation of the FBiH Constitution and the BiH Constitution, but also a violation of the Washington and Dayton Peace Accords. Finally, let us emphasize the fact that these are peace agreements.

18. lipanj 2024 06:53